

#### d. Japanese Reluctance Toward Korea

Unfortunately, but it is true that the number of Japanese who show the reluctance to the relationship between Japan and Korea is increasing in recent years. One of the major reasons is said their being fed up with its endless demands of apology of the past. Since the Chun Doo Hwan government, South Korea has repeatedly demanded the liquidation of the "past", which Japanese government recognized as already settled by the Basic Treaty in 1965. In 1981, Chun's government demanded \$6 billion loan as some sort of compensation. And in 1990, when President Roh visited Japan, the issue of apology, especially Emperor's remarks over the past, was stuck to seriously, so was Chun's visit in 1984. In both cases, Emperor's remarks of apology was demanded by the South's government and both of them were criticized as "vague apology" by the South's newspapers. Even President Roh stated after coming back to Seoul that no matter how Japan apologizes, it is insufficient.(69) This statement certainly made the Japanese enthusiasm for the better relationship gone, in spite of his dignified speech in the Japanese Diet.

When the prime minister Miyazawa visited South Korea in January 1992, he was forced to apologize by the "comfort woman" campaign from the beginning to the end of his visit, while he had a plan to appeal the Japanese foreign policy in a lofty tone for his first trip abroad as a prime minister. The South's government could neither get any substantial results from Japan concerning the trade deficit and technology transfer, but only the embarrassment remained between the two countries after the Miyazawa's visit. Sad to say, since Roh's visit in 1990, the reluctant feeling toward the Korean issues has certainly been getting pervasive among the silent majority of Japanese, who grumbled behind their backs; as "how soon would the Japan-Korea relationship be gotten out of the past?"

It seems that the "past" is a kind of trump card against Japan for the Korean people. This card has yielded lots of benefits for the Korea, like the compensation, apology from Japan and the consolidation inside the South. On the other hand, this card has accumulated the frustration especially among the younger generation who genuinely desired a normal relationship between the two countries, because this card had played a role to repress their freedom of speech about the Korean issues to some extent. After Roh's visit in 1990, although the South's government stated that the apology would not be demanded any more in future, it was easily breached two years later. Japanese seems to deem that the Korean people would never waive this card.

Until four or five years ago, Japanese had never expressed their reluctance toward the Japan-Korea relationship, even if they had thought of it in their mind. However, in recent days, some celebrated scholars whose opinions have strong impact on Japanese people commented in public, "the unified Korea would

demand the apology once again"; or "the demand of the apology might be endless and limitless, because it is rooted in the psychology of the Korean people"; or "the more we apologize, the worse the relationship will be." (70) During Miyazawa's visit to Seoul, the performance in which the Korean demonstrator burned the doll disguised as Japanese Emperor in front of the Japanese embassy had seriously offended the majority of the Japanese people and enlarged the hard feeling toward the Japan-Korea relationship. Many people say the relationship between the two countries is the worst since the normalization in 1965, even it is still getting worse. I think both countries need more cool, courteous attitude toward the relationship. We would have to concern that if the same situation continues, the anti-Japanese campaign may stimulate the nationalism of younger Japanese generation who have less expiration feeling and convert the reluctant feeling into anti-Korean sentiments eventually. If there is even a tiny indication of it, the Japanese government had better to take another policy toward the Korea as the second best in order to prevent the anti-Korean sentiments from growing up among the younger generation.

#### e. Proposal for Japanese Foreign Policy

Korean Peninsula had been a sort of unlucky quarter in Japanese history. The lessons of Japanese modern history show that the involvement in the peninsula which had been fortified by the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War misled the Japanese foreign policy and consequently caused the Pacific War. The international situation both around and inside the peninsula has tremendously changed and has become much more complicated than before. However, the peninsula is located same thirty miles north-west of Japan and Japan has to face the relation with this neighbor. Judging from the present situation mentioned above, the important thing for the Japanese foreign policy toward the peninsula is to take the less evil steps considering not only the international and domestic situation of the peninsula but also the Korean's anti-Japanese sentiments as well as the Japanese reluctant feeling toward Korea. In another word, the prudence is most needed.

The basic stance will be to prevent from being deeply involved in the peninsula. The foreign policy toward Korea without much thought might enhance the anti-Japanese sentiments, which would cause the vicious circle of mutual antagonism. Japan has no more threat behind the peninsula, after the giant communist regime of the Soviet Union collapsed. And China has also been changing greatly. The peninsula is no more a "dagger pointed toward the heart of Japan." There is no need for Japan to be deeply involved in it. It needs more time to establish the intimate relationship between Japan and Korea. To rush is dangerous under the present situation. As long as the anti-Japanese sentiments is rooted in the Korean's nationalism, the more often the two governments contact, the more the hard feelings will be created among them. We have to enhance the non-government ex-

changes much more in stead of the contacts between the governments in future for promoting mutual understanding, in order not only to prevent the anti-Japanese sentiments from enlarging any more but also to prevent the reluctance feeling toward Korea from being transfigured into the anti-Korean sentiments.

Toward North Korea, the Japanese basic stance must be the same. The North's people should have stronger animosity against Japan than that of the South. The normalization talks between Japan and North Korea has just started since January 1991. Sooner or later, Japan will have to provide the economic assistance to the North. As told above, Japanese economic assistance is indispensable for the soft-landing of the reunification or even the co-existence of the North and the South. However, even when Japan provides the assistance to the North, Japan has to try to avoid being deeply involved in the North's issues. Generally speaking, whenever the country provides some assistance to another country, it is likely to intervene in her domestic issues. But it will never yield the good results in the long run, especially for the relationship between Japan and Korea.

As regards the negotiation with North Korea, Japan has to make the intransigent points clear to the North's leaders and try not to intervene the others. As Nodong Sinmun (the North's official newspaper) stated, "... we treasure national dignity and sovereignty more than life", the North is the state which emphasize the face so much.(71) The intervention would produce nothing except many reverse effects. Japan must minimize the intransigent points, which must be nuclear issues and Japanese abducted issues. The other issues, such as human right, its unique regime, hereditary, and etc., must not be intervened in order not to be deeply involved. Those are up to the Korean people. Those will be weakened out through the process of natural selection after once opening to foreign trade and diplomatic relation, even without any intervention.

Japan must never intervene in the reunification issues except the economic assistance. The reunification issues should be left to the inter-Korean negotiation. Only the Korean people can resolve the issues. The essential things for the stable transition to a Unified Korea are, as mentioned before, time, dialogue and economic assistance. Japan has to lead the North to take a positive attitude toward dialogue and exchange with the South through the Japan-North Korea normalization talks. Japan had better not expect that the economic assistance could lead the North to open and reform. This expectation might be dangerous, because it could cause her to be deeply involved. The purpose of the economic assistance must be to minimize the economical disorder that will take place after the reunification, by means of minimizing the gap between North and South. The present huge scale of gap should bring about massive political, economical disorder, which cannot be compared with that of Germany and such damages must affect Japan. The economic assistance should be much cheaper than the cost of the damage.

On the other hand, Japan should never compromise the nuclear issues, nor go ahead with the normalization without clearing its suspicion. It is important to make this Japanese stance clear to the North's leaders. North Korea had past record as a terrorist nation and its leaders who are only informed of their favorable information in the isolated country have high possibility to misjudge or miscalculate the international situation, just like they did announce the pull out of NPT on March 12, 1993. North Korea might use the nuclear as a last diplomatic card in order to preserve the Kim dynasty. The nuclear suspicion could not only interfere the soft-landing of the reunification, but also upset the balance of power in North East Asia. Japan, as the only one atomic-bombed nation, has to take the initiative in making the North abandon the nuclear weapon by using every means in collaboration with the U.S., China, Russia, and South Korea.

In order to clear the suspicion, first of all, we need collaboration efforts to persuade the North to reverse its decision to withdraw from the global nuclear-inspection system. And then, special inspection as been demanded by the IAEA or the simultaneous inspections of each other's facilities by North and South Korea will be needed. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry's estimate, as mentioned before, the North had already extracted about 24kg of plutonium, which could produce 2-3 atomic bombs. It is true that it's practically impossible for the IAEA to find out them, because there is estimated to be over ten thousands tunnels in the North. However, the important point is to force the North to give up any more nuclear weapons program in future. As long as the North denies, Japan should never proceed the normalization talk and should consider measures to disapprove the re-entrance of the Korean people living in Japan after their visit to the North as the last resort. The trade between Japan and North Korea amounts to 400 to 500 million dollars per year and almost all of these are from the trade between the North and the Korean people living in Japan.(72) Japan must prevent these profit from supporting, even indirectly, the nuclear weapon project of the North.

The nations around the North must keep in step with each other to press the North. Especially China and Russia which used to be sponsors have to play an important role to dissuade the North. Recently both countries seems to take some sort of fence-sitting policy in order to strengthen their influence over the peninsula.(73) However, no nation gains any benefit from the nuclear weapon of the North. Japan must negotiate with them to keep in step with others. The negotiation could be linked to her economic assistance to them. The cooperated pressure might hurt the North's face and stimulate its nationalism, however, it will make it clear for the leaders what is the most beneficial to the North.

#### f. Proposal for Japanese Defense Policy

Since 1977, Japan's defense capability has been improved in

accordance with the "National Defense Program Outline" which is based on the "concept of basic defense capability". The concept of basic defense capability is an idea that Japan would not become an unstable element in this region by becoming a force vacuum rather than aiming at directly countering a military threat to the country.(74) However, it is true that Japan had improved the defense capability with a great concern over the threat of Soviet forces in Far East. As regards the deployment of troops, the delivery of new weapons and the modernization of weapons, the priority had been given to the northern part of Japan. Since the situation around Japan has greatly changed, such as the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the emerge of the nuclear suspicion of North Korea, the questions have been raised concerning about the present defense posture of Japan in recent years. Should Japan change her defense policy?

Although the former Soviet Union was dissolved, it is true that there still exist enormous stockpiles of rationalized and modernized armed forces in our neighborhood across the sea including Japanese northern territories. It seems that arms production levels have declined and the part of its modernization program was canceled or postponed, slowing the pace of modernization. However, as it is still unclear where Russia is heading, it is difficult to predict the future and the existence of enormous war potential, with nuclear weapons, is an uncertain factor in peace and stability. Since the essence of defense lies in preparedness against unpredicted emergencies and there is still possibility of serious situational changes as the factors of uncertainty, Japan should keep the "concept of basic defense capability", which could enable the country to switch smoothly to a new defense posture when serious change developed. The intention could be changed over night, while it takes huge cost and long time to build up the defense capability.

As long as Japan maintains the basic defense capability based on the "National Defense Program Outline" under the Japan-U.S. security treaty, Japan could cope with whatever happened coinciding with the reunification except long-range missile attack. Although the size of North Korean forces is quite large, those forces have been built up against the South, and the equipments are generally obsolete. They are not so much threat to Japan. However, in recent years, North Korea is reported to be developing the new "surface to surface missile" with a range of 1000km, which can cover the western Japan and other parts of the Japanese territory. If North Korea succeeded in developing this missile, it would be a threat to Japan. Japan has no capability to cope with it right now. We should go ahead with the modernization project of Patriot missile together with AWACS in order to build up the anti-missile capability. Since the Cold War ended, Japan will keep the minimum size of Defense forces. However, Japan should never lack any function in her defense capability, which should have a broad range of defense functions that enable the country to take minimum necessary actions to counter various sort of threats.

To cope with the nuclear suspicion of North Korea, Japan should, as mentioned above, take diplomatic measures with consolidating nations around the North. Especially, the firm Japan-U.S. alliance endorsed by the Japan-U.S. security arrangement must be very important, which will play a key role in the direction of such efforts. Japan should never change her "Three Non-nuclear Principles" of "not possessing, not producing and not permitting introduction of nuclear weapons", to which Japan adheres as the fixed line of national policy. This policy must continue to be the best for Japan as ever, not only from the view point of foreign policy, but also from the military point of view. It would be impossible for Japan to defend such tiny isles practically from nuclear attacks. It would be impossible either to deter them by her own nuclear weapons.

On the contrary, should Japan possess such nuclear weapons, it would merely upset the military balance in Asia-Pacific region and boost her defense expenditure drastically and, consequently, create tensions and wariness in the nations around Japan, which should exert a harmful influence on Japan as a peaceful trading country firmly aligned with the Free World. Japan would never have a grain of benefit from it, nor the other nations around her. The best way for Japan to defend from the nuclear threat is, same as ever, to ensure its security by forming an alliance with the militarily powerful U.S. which shares the basic common value and ideas, thereby effectively putting to work the war deterrent capability of the U.S. So, Japan would continue to make efforts to enhance the credibility of the arrangement through offering facilities, areas to the U.S. forces and bearing a higher burden sharing with regard to the expenses involved in the forward deployment of U.S. forces. And also, it is very important for Japan to show herself to other countries as an exemplary non-nuclear weapons state under the IAEA in order not to arouse the suspicion of other countries about her intention.

To wrap up, Japan should never change the defense policy based on the "concept of basic defense capability" together with non-nuclear principle except promoting some modernization projects to supplement the lack of capability, such as protection against missile attack, even after the great changes such as the dissolution of Soviet Union and the emergence of the North Korea's nuclear suspicion and so on.

## 6. Proposal for U.S. Policy Toward Korea

According to the proposal of "The Democratic Confederation Republic of Koryo", North Korea had emphasized preconditions such as the resignation of the South Korean military regime, withdrawal of the U.S. military forces, abolishment of South Korea's Anti-communist and National Security Laws for the reunification. Since that proposal in 1980, the situation has been remarkably changed. And also, the tone of the Kim Il-sung's speech has become much softer than before. Although the official newspapers of the North have still strongly denounced the U.S. forces in

Korea as "obstacle to the cause of peace in Asia"(75), the immediate withdrawal has become no more prerequisite to the reunification in Kim Il-sung's speech.

The Anti-communist and National Security Laws have not been abolished yet, however, the democratic presidential elections were conducted in 1987 and 1992, and the first President not related to the military was elected in the last election. Since the democratization was enhanced as a part of Roh's Nordpolitik, the South's people became to be able to access any information, even about the North, almost freely. The South could be said to be no more military regime and to have achieved the democratization in a sense that the people could choose their own regime by their own will. Therefore, the withdrawal of the U.S. military forces must become the key point for the reunification in future, although "immediate withdrawal" disappeared in Kim Il-sung's speech. North Korea seems to find it as the last pretext for denouncing the South.

Some people say that the foreign military forces were proved to be no obstacle for the reunification by the German case. But it is not accurate. When two Germanys reunified, both of them had stationed foreign troops respectively. However, the Soviet military forces stationed after the Second World War had already withdrawn from the North by the end of 1948 and the Chinese forces which had shed blood together during Korean War had withdrawn by 1958. Only U.S. forces have still been there. It is true that the U.S. military forces had indeed played a very important role as a safety shield to deter an attack from the North. As they say that the partial withdrawal of the U.S. forces -- about twenty-five thousands soldiers from 1948 to 1949 -- caused the North to run the risk, it is unquestionable that the existence of the U.S. forces had maintained the balance of power on the peninsula and repressed the long-desire of Kim Il-sung who had insisted armed liberation consistently.

However, the situation around the peninsula had drastically changed from the time of 1960s to 1970s, when the U.S. had worried about the peninsula being affected by the communism. The U.S. has no need to worry about the domino theory, since people were disenchanted of the communism, influenced by the collapse of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The sponsors which had supported the North have already lost their value to continue to assist the North voluntarily and have begun implementing the fence-sitting policy toward North and South Korea, for their own interest, not for ideology. The North can not afford to launch another war of liberation against the South by herself, not only for military reason but also for economical reason, and the former sponsors would never support it either. Furthermore, the South's power has become large enough to be able to deter the North's ambition.

The cost of more than two billion dollars a year to maintain the U.S. forces in peninsula must be a heavy burden for the U.S. together with her huge financial deficit. If it is for the sake of U.S. presence in Asia or the forward deployment forces, the

U.S. doesn't need to deploy both in Japan and Korea to play these role. The lessons of Gulf War show that the victory can be gained through rapid unit deployment and precision-guided targeting by a small air force squadron.(76) There is no need for the U.S. to deploy big military forces in the South where the anti-American sentiments are growing, following their promoted nationalism. The opinion poll of a major Korean newspaper shows that 55.4% of "phased withdrawal" and 3.8% of "immediate withdrawal" outreach 32.3% of "against withdrawal". And the result of a questionnaire conducted by a certain university in the South shows that 84.3% perceives "negative influence" about the U.S. role for the reunification and 67.9% answered "U.S. forces should be withdrawn".(77)

Of course the U.S. forces in Korea must be needed for the security of the peninsula under such present situation as the tension increasing after the North's announcement of its pulling out of NPT in March 1993. From the long stand point of view, the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty may be needed, even after the reunification for the security of Northeast Asia, however, the big U.S. military in Korea will not only lose its raison d'e-tre, but also be an obstacle for their reunification in future.

Basically, the U.S. should leave the reunification issue to their own choice preventing herself from being involved in. Only the Korean people can resolve the issues that stand in the way of national reconciliation and eventual unification. It must be beneficial to the U.S. also that the reunification would be achieved by peaceful means and consequently a stable peninsula would be created, followed by the reduction of the U.S. military expenditure. The only question is whether it can be achieved by peaceful means or not. The U.S. should take advantage of this withdrawal of U.S. forces as a diplomatic leverage for promoting the dialogue between North and South. In other words, the U.S. should step up the withdrawal on condition that the peaceful measures such as the North-South dialogue, confidence building measure (CBM), arms control and etc. would be promoted. Of course, we could not say that there would be no possibility for the North to challenge the risk after resuming the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Therefore, by the time when the peaceful reunification could be convinced, the U.S. should maintain the rapid unit deployment status as a commitment in order to deter the conflict on the peninsula.

Before the withdrawal is resumed, it is important the command relations between the U.S. forces in Korea and Korean forces to be established properly. Since President Rhee Syngman sent the letter to General MacArthur, Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, about the transfer of the command authority on July 14, 1950, the next month after the War broke out, and the South Korean forces have become under the operational command authority of the U.N. forces, actually under the commander of U.S. forces in Korea. It is true that this command status has given the North the pretext to denounce the South as a puppet of "American Imperialism".



In October 1992, the U.S. and the South agreed that armistice operation control over the Korean Armed Forces would be transferred to Korea by the end of 1994.(78) However, it needs to transfer the wartime operational control also to Korea as early as possible, not only for the smooth conversion to "rapid deployment" style's commitment after resuming withdrawal, but also for the promotion of the dialogue between North and South by not giving the North an excuse to denounce.

After the transfer of the command authority, the command structure of the U.S.-Korean combined forces would be recommended to be formed the same way as that of Japan-U.S. security arrangement, in which each force is to be commanded by each commander respectively under the close coordination between two commanders, because it is expected that the U.S. will be reluctant to go under the commander of a foreign country. Although the efficiency of wartime combined operation in this command structure will be inferior to the present one, there is not so big difference from the view point of deterrence to the North.

As for the reunification issues, the U.S. should never compromise the nuclear suspicion of the North. This matter will serve as some sort of test for the new world order after the Cold War. If the U.S. left this matter unsettled through her compromise, the nuclear proliferation might be unceasing followed by other developing countries and launch the world wide instability eventually. Historically, it was proved. The development of nuclear weapon of China induced that of India which had confronted with China and consequently Pakistan which had confronted with India developed it. The nuclear weapon usually sets off a chain of reaction in near countries. And it is not correct either that the North can't afford it because of its critical economy. The GNP per capita of India was \$350 in 1987 and that of Pakistan was \$393 in 1988. The GNP per capita of North Korea, as mentioned before, is estimated \$400-\$500, which can not deny its capability.

It needs for the U.S. to act as a leader of the nations around the North, especially Japan, Russia, China, and South Korea, in order to press the North to abandon nuclear weapon project by every possible means including her intelligence and military capability. Since 1991, the several concessions which the South and the U.S. made, such as the removal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from the South, the suspension of "Team Spirit", has not drawn out any substantial concession from the North. On the contrary, Kim Il-sung made a bluff remark in February 1993, saying "any attempt to force it to accept special international inspections could touch off another Korean war....it would result in plunging the whole land of the North and the South into the holocaust of war".(79) And finally, the North announced the withdrawal from NPT on March 12, 1993.

When we negotiate with the North, we should consider the national traits of the North, such as "treasuring national digni-

ty and sovereignty more than life". In the light of its traits, the "Team Spirit '93" may have been not so good policy. However, it is also true there is essentially no way except power to change the mind, thought, and attitude of such dictators as Muammaral Qaddafi of Libya, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and Kim Il-sung of North Korea. We should not repeat the Chamberlain's mistake. Concerning to this issue, the U.S. strong leadership will be expected not only for the security of Northeast Asia, but also for the new world order being groped after the Cold War. In other words, it would be some sort of touchstone for the future.

## 7. Conclusion

Under the international situation greatly changed after the Cold War, North and South Korea fed up with the long confrontation seem to begin to realize that it is a much better option to gain economical benefits under lasting peace than to waste time, resources, and energy under the ideological confrontation.

The North which had more stressed on the ideology, nationalism, and dignity than economy has suffered from the economical stagnation. On the other hand, the South which had taken "construction first" strategy by shutting off all discussion of democratization and nationalism has enjoyed mounting nationalism based on the economical confidence. Under these circumstances, as the hoops, named "Cold War" was taken off, which had kept the division stiff, it must be sure that they will be reunified sooner or later.

However, there must be many twists and turns before the reunification achieved, since both systems became so much incongruous already and the Korean people are not easy to agree with each other, who are influenced by Confucianism that stressed the dignity and prefer the factious struggle abusing the empty concept and are not good at compromise. Especially, the long-term dictatorship regime of Kim Il-sung is surely expected to become the biggest obstacle for the peaceful reunification.

Although every despotic ruler tends to hope his regime and ideology ever lasting, the history shows that it was an unfulfilled dream. It is some sort of historical law that after Kim Il-sung "Kim Il-sung" will be downgraded by the name of "Anti-Kim-ism", just like "Anti-Maoism" after Mao Zedong and "Anti-Stalinism" after Joseph Stalin. It will be a key point for the soft landing of reunification how we could minimize the tremor caused by the conversion of Kim Il-sung regime.

I conclude my paper by summing up the strategy by which the related nations must act in concert with each other toward the North, based on the prudent consideration about the unique traits of Korean people and Korean Peninsula, in order to achieve the soft landing of reunification.

In the short term:

- to persuade the North to reverse its decision to withdraw from the global nuclear-inspection system
- to let the North abandon nuclear weapon project
- to deter the North from running the risk to touch off another war

In the mid term:

- to promote the dialogue between North and South
- to withdraw the U.S. forces gradually on condition of convincing security on the peninsula
- to enhance the confidence building measures (CBM) and arms control including arms reduction

In the long term:

- to promote the exchange, communication between North and South
- to provide economical assistance to activate the economy of North Korea

Of course, it must be not so easy and there must be "back and forth" in future, however, it is essential for nations concerned to cooperate with it through paying close attention to its transition for the sake of peaceful reunification.

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