

tries gathered in Paris for the signing of a multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention which forswear the possession, production, stockpiling, transfer, and the use of chemical weapons. Although all countries around the North signed this treaty, North Korea has refused to sign it.

3. Scenarios and Process of Reunification

The peaceful unification must contribute to the stability of not only the peninsula, but also the whole East Asia and the relief from the heavy burden of defense expenditure should activate the economical prosperity which will improve the standard of living on the peninsula. However, the question is how peaceful the scenario will be, and how smooth the process will be. In some case, it is possible that the result could yield thousands of boat people, create more poverty and cause irreparable instability in East Asia. And, if the unified Korea became a nation of anti-democratic and anti-liberal regime with heavy military forces equipped with nuclear weapons or if the unified Korea became a nation of anti-American and anti-Japanese regime without market economy system, excluding the U.S. forces as well as the Treaty with the U.S., it might be another source of concern about the international security in the future. The following is what we have to consider for the sake of soft-landing of the unification, contributing to the stability in East Asia.

a. Historical Point of View

The division of Korea occurred in the last five months of 1945. The decision on the thirty-eighth parallel was made between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a harried day just before the war ended, in order to find a line to demarcate Soviet and U.S. responsibilities in accepting the Japanese surrender. The thirty-eighth parallel is just the line drawn by two young colonels, who were asked to find a place to draw a line across Korea by Assistant Secretary of War at the night-long session of the State-War Navy Coordinating Committee on August 10-11, 1945. They were given thirty minutes to decide. One of the colonels later said that he chose the thirty-eighth parallel "because it included the capital city, Seoul, in the U.S. zone and this line was further north than could be realistically reached ...in the event of Soviet disagreement". The State Department had worried about Soviet involvement in or control of Korea, as a threat to Pacific security. The colonel said it was "somewhat surprised" when the Soviet agreed about it.(43) The Soviets had already engaged the Japanese in Korea, so they could have marched on to Pusan.

In September 1945, U.S. forces landed southern Korea. But if the U.S. had occupied southern Korea merely to disarm the Japanese, its soldiers could have left within a few weeks. Because the Japanese were in no mood to fight at the time. Fears of Soviet penetration of Korea were the basic reason for the

dispatch of troops. The counter-revolutionary goals became the overriding concern of the occupation. For the U.S., the occupation that transformed a temporary partition into a solidified division was indispensable to hold the South against both the Soviets and indigenous revolutionaries.(44) The division was actually solidified by each independence, South Korea in August 1948 and North Korea in September 1948 and also definitely solidified by Korean War.

During the Cold War era, each Korea had tried to exclude the other by taking advantage of each hegemony of the two big powers. In a sense, both Koreas have reinforced the Cold War which was struggling for supremacy between U.S. and Soviet, and also the Cold War has fortified the division. So the end of the Cold War will make it clear what are other factors supporting the division.

In the last twenty years, we witnessed two contrasted examples of unification, Germany and Vietnam. The German style unification was achieved after having continuous intervisitation, communication, and interrelationship since mutual recognition. And Vietnamese style was achieved by means of armed liberation commanded by one side without having interrelationship. We can't predict yet which type both Koreas would choose. They might seek a third style. Historically speaking, the process of Vietnamese style creates much more instability, animosity, mutual distrust, victims, and is much more costly than that of German style. It is absolutely certain that German style is better and desirable.

The history of the Korean division is totally different from that of Germany. The division of Germany was brought about by the result of being defeated in the last war, which was caused by Germany itself. On the other hand, Korean division was created by the hegemony struggle of other nations at the place where Japanese hegemony disappeared after forty years of Japanese colonization. For the people on the Korean Peninsula, it seems to be deserved retribution that Germany had been divided, but definitely irrational that Korean people, victims of colonization, have been divided by the powers of outside countries. This is one of the reasons why the Korean people, especially North Koreans, had shown their stubbornness not to admit two nations on the peninsula by September 1991, while two Germanys had recognized each other and had tried to live together in mutual prosperity, despite their confrontation.

It looks much easier for the two Koreas to reunify than Germany, because the people on the peninsula don't feel remorse like German people do and they can evolve their nationalism which had been repressed without any restriction. However, there is a decisive difference from Germany, that two Koreas fought each other and shed their blood at Korean War in 1950. Moreover, the leader who waged the war still reigns over one side. Therefore, the people of both sides have had strong feeling of antagonism, animosity and lacked confidence and trust in each other ever

since the outbreak of the war. In addition, the problem of family members separated between the two areas since the war makes the matter more complicated. The constitution of each side still stipulates the other side as an illegal nation and emphasizes its sovereignty of the whole peninsula and the legal diplomatic representative of the whole Korean people, respectively.

South Korea has admitted co-existence of the two nations since relatively earlier years and advocated the need of mutual recognition and co-prosperity over and over. However, even the South has not yet abolished the Anti-Communist and National Security Laws so far, which prohibit the people from getting in touch with the North without the government permission. And Seoul has still appointed the mayors of countries and cities in the North and has sponsored athletic meet for the people who used to live in the North.(45)

These distrust and lack of confidence will not be dissolved in a short period of time, because these are emotional and sentimental, not theoretical. In February 1992, the two prime ministers signed and put into effect three auxiliary followed-up protocols to implement the inter-Korean Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, which went into effect in December 1991. But two sides failed to reach any resolution or make any progress on the exchange visit of long-dispersed families and joint inter-Korean inspection of nuclear installations and military bases. In order to implement these agreements, it is essential for mutual animosity to be dissolved first, which has been pervasive especially among bureaucrats and journalists. The history of almost fifty years' division has created two profoundly different regimes and had made their internal matter international. To achieve the German style unification, which is historically said to be better than the Vietnamese style, they must liquidate their old grudge and animosity and build mutual confidence by promoting communication, intervisitation and many sorts of exchanges between them and also the economic gap must be closed by establishing a relationship of coexistence and co-prosperity, as well as promoting economic cooperation.

b. Forms of Reunification

There have been two comprehensive proposals about the form of reunification, proposed by each side respectively. In October 1980, Kim Il-sung suggested a creation of the "The Democratic Confederation Republic of Koryo". And in September 1989, Roh Tae Woo announced "The National Community Reunification Formula", which proposed "Korean Commonwealth" as a transitional arrangement.

There are some profound differences and some important similarities between them. One of the important similarities is that the reunification should be achieved "independently" by the

efforts of their own people, free from any foreign interference and "peacefully" through north-south contact and dialogue without recourse to arms. And the other point is that the immediate reunification under one system is unrealistic at present. One big difference is that the North considers "Confederal" republic to be a permanent arrangement, i.d. "unification" itself; but the South considers "Commonwealth" to be a transitional arrangement.

The Commonwealth should have a Council of Representatives as the legislative body, and the Council of Representatives should draft a constitution for a reunified Korea later. And the South advocates that at the final phase the reunification should be achieved through general election, for a democratic republic with a single central government and a single system of policy, economy and so on.

The North Korean proposal envisioned the establishment of a supreme national confederal assembly composed of an equal number of representatives from the North and from the South plus some overseas Korean representatives. This assembly would create a standing committee to act as its executive and guide the existing governments of the North and the South. Each side would have its own government, presumably continuing the governments (and economic systems also) that already exist. The North says the reunited nation would be neutral or independent in foreign policy without foreign alliances. The two stages of the republic would presumably have the task of reducing and combining their military forces.(46)

The concept of the North's proposal is the unification of the people on the peninsula rather than that of systems in Korea. One official of North Korea showed its background as follows; It is extremely hard to imagine that one side would willingly abandon its own systems and accept those of the other side on present conditions, in which different ideas, regimes and systems have already rooted in each country for almost half century. The unification of systems should be achieved through general election of the North and the South. However, under such present circumstances, the result of the general election would never be accepted by one side. If we went ahead and pursued the single system unification, it should create another confrontation and collision and also cause a large scale of damage inevitably. Considering these realistic points of view, North Korea became to advocate the reunification of the people, not system, in order to achieve it peacefully.(47)

It is true what is mentioned above, however, this proposal contains much skepticism that are categorized into two groups. One is the question of feasibility and the other is the question of inconsistency with its past policy. This proposal envisions the establishment of a nation constituted by different systems, capitalism and socialism. We could never find such a nation in the past history. "A nation with one race, two systems and two governments" makes us predict its instability, judging from the concept of "nation".

It is almost impossible to predict that the economic system would indeed work well in such a nation. If it were just transitional, it might be possible. The economic gap between North and South is so large that the market mechanism must necessarily lead this unification to the German style after removing the border and enabling the exchanges of people, information freely. And if the nation continued some restrictions on such exchanges, by stressing the preservation of two systems, it would be nothing changed as today, except getting the name of "unified" while losing one seat in the U.N.

The course of their military forces would be not so easy question, either. This proposal says that the military strength of both sides should be reduced to 100 to 150 thousands respectively and a combined national army should be formed under the unified leadership of the confederal government, which is independent of either side, north or south. However, either side which practically assumed control of the combined national army could be a de-facto ruler over "Koryo Confederation". So, the keen struggle for control of military between them could easily be predicted.

Another question is about inconsistency with its past demands. North Korea had long accused "simultaneous admittance to the U.N." as pursuing "two Koreas" or making the "separation permanent", and also decisively opposed the South Korean proposal of mutual recognition, co-existence and co-prosperity for the same reason. However, "Confederal Koryo" proposal which stresses "continuing the governments and economic systems that already exist" has much more practical potential of making the separation permanent. Besides, North Korea considers it to be a permanent arrangement. And also, this proposal is inconsistent with its "armed liberation policy" which had been insisted by Kim Il-sung. We have never heard the revision of the Kim Il-sung speech, which already referred to, saying "It can be achieved only after the present puppet regime is overturned and the progressive forces seize power in South Korea".

The book published by the North Korean government for only domestic circulation in 1987, seven years after its proposal, emphasized the reunification by liberation of the South under the flag of "Great Kim Il-sung and Great Juche philosophy", that was entirely different from its proposal which calls to accept dual ideologies and systems.(48) And the North Korean advocacy which has still been emphasizing Juche philosophy as the one and only would never become congruent with its proposal, that has to admit not only the variety of different philosophies but also the antiestablishment.

In addition to the inconsistency, the fact of its terrorism after this proposal in 1980, such as the bombing in Rangoon in 1983 and the KAL bombing in 1987, shows that the sincerity of North Korean calls for peaceful co-existence and peaceful reunification is dubious at best.

c. Real Intention of North Korea

According to the North Korean proposal, the North had emphasized some preconditions such as the resignation of the South Korean military regime, withdrawal of the U.S. military force, abolishment of South Korea's Anti-communist Law and the National Security Law.(49) In recent years, the word of "preconditions" for reunification doesn't appear in Kim Il-sung's speech, although the North's official newspapers still strongly demand them. It is true that these had been long-standing demands of Pyongyang, ever since the end of the Korean War, and they were also prerequisites for the North to launch another "war of liberation" against the South. So, when we consider the North's proposal with these conditions, it seems there has been no considerable change in the North Korean official position.

North Korea has been advocating the reunification more ardently than South Korea since its partition. And it is also true that North Korea has mobilized the people for the heavy burden on the pretext of "for the sake of reunification". In a sense, it could be said that North Korea has made hay with "reunification" in order to maintain its regime. The word of "reunification" became main tools to keep its system, in which the economy is worst and the people are forced to live almost on a war basis. People seem to be making do with some sort of "reunification religion".(50) In order to justify their continued rule to the domestic public, North Korean government has to continue advocating the "reunification". However, the leaders of the North do know that the present international situation is worst for them to go ahead with the reunification. So I suppose they would actually rather gain time until the situation is improved in order to keep their system intact facing the serious challenges from abroad.

There are lots of circumstantial examples to prove this intention. The ten-point policy of the confederal state which was addressed by Kim Il-sung in September 1983 included the encouragement of exchange and cooperation in the spheres of economy, science, culture, education and the reopennesness of transport and communication links between the north and south. South Korea has responded to this policy with its emphasis that they could go ahead with these activities even before the reunification being achieved. But North Korea has rejected this proposal by demanding simultaneous resolution of military confrontation and other matters and also denied even talks of humanitarian concern for the intervisitation and communication of dispersed families. This stubbornness reveals the North's anxiety about the political risk of opening up the country to the outside, particularly to South Korea.

The exchanges between North and South must accelerate the German style unification. For North Korea, the German style unification means the collapse of "Kim Dynasty". Its leaders

should try to avoid the German style by any means. We can see their great concern about the German style unification from its press embargo for one month and half about "Berlin Wall" collapse. Kim Il-sung and his son must have taken the warning of East German Honneker and Rumanian Ceausescu seriously. After the Ceausescu incident, the luxurious party had been suspended, which had been held each year since 1983 to celebrate the birth-days of Kim Il-sung and his son together with many foreign diplomats invited.(51)

A Russian Tass correspondent published the result of interviews with "Nomenklaturas". That revealed their reluctance about the reunification. The middle or low ranking officials of the Party and bureaucrats did not want not only the reunification but also even the contacts with the people of the South.(52) They knew what terrible life the people of East Germany, especially same ranking officials as them, have gotten after the unification. They don't want to lose the present privilege that guarantees them relatively high standard of living.

Kim Il-sung's policy has been supported by the wide variety of officials, mainly the officials who have the strong power in the sphere of economy, military, Party and so on. Their total number is estimated to be 3 - 5 million people, including their family. According to the result of their interviewing, it doesn't matter for them which is better, communism or capitalism. It dose matter for them whether they can continue to receive the same prerogative or not after the reunification. In another sense, if the Kim Il-sung regime threatened their privilege, it could be probable that they would turn down "Kim family" and hand its power to another regime who guarantees their life or privilege.

North Korea has never considered the plan of reunification without Kim Il-sung or his son at present, and they would never compromise the scenario or the process which has the potential of any kind of tremor in Kim regime, by means of demanding the "Confederal Koryo".

d. Korean Commonwealth

The government of South Korea is quite skeptical about the North's proposal. Seoul has pointed out that North Korea has not explained how confederation would be achieved, particularly in the absence of trust-building measure. There has never been such a confederation which contains two different economic, political systems in the history. In addition, there is no explanation about the mechanism of how to get the consensus inside the confederation, especially about the problem that has a stake in each government.(53) South Korea is distrustful of it and has suspected that this proposal might be one of its armed liberation policies and once "Confederal Koryo" were formed, the North Korean Government, together with the South's pro-north people, would attempt to reunify the nation under the North regime.(54)

On the other hand, Roh Tae Woo's proposal, "Korean Commonwealth", seems to be more practical and realistic form of reunification. This proposal suggests "one nation, two systems" as the transitional arrangement, in order to achieve the final goal, "one race, one nation, one system", peacefully in future. In this announcement in September 1989, South Korea proposed a pact of mutual recognition and nonaggression, a presidential summit, a high-level official conference and a general conference as well as to open liaison bureaus. Moreover, many activities in nonpolitical area for co-existence and co-prosperity were suggested so that the final goal will gradually be pursued.

Based on the reality that there are two completely different systems on the peninsula at present, this proposal tries to construct the basic foundation for the future political reunification, through co-existence and co-prosperity and also promoting the inter-Korean contacts and cooperation. It is almost impossible for two societies of entirely different natures created by almost half century separation to form one nation without any preparation and time. This "Korean Commonwealth" formula was drafted as a transitional phase to prepare for the final phase of "one race, one nation, one system". Therefore, "Korean Commonwealth" is not a "confederation" nor a "federation", but a special transitional form of a nation.

South Korea explained how the reunification would be achieved; At the first phase, the form of "one race, two nations, and two systems" would be achieved and then "one race, one nation and two systems" at the second phase and "one race, one nation and one system" at the final phase. The first phase is a kind of symbolic phase, in which exchanges and cooperation will be promoted and non-aggression treaty and some other agreements or treaty about the confidence building measures (CBM) would be prepared. The second phase is a practical working phase, in which the security measures would be assured by arms control including arms reduction of both side and achievements of national identity in all areas would be enhanced. And the new constitution of the reunified nation would be drafted and should be ratified by referendum in this second phase. At the final phase, the unified government and Congress would be established by general election.(55)

It is true that there are many substantial common points between the transitional phase of South's proposal and "Confederal Koryo" proposal. However, the South's proposal must be a threat to the North, because its final objective is to form a single political system. For the North, a single political system means the reunification under the capitalism, since the South Korean economic preponderance over the North should absorb the North inevitably. After this proposal was made by the South, the immediate response from the North was, of course, a negative one. North Korea will never compromise in the near future, however, there might be a practical and possible step remained to grope for the common points between these proposals, toward the

reunification.

4. Activities toward Reunification

a. Dialogue between North and South

There have been many contacts at Panmunjom, such as political and military talks, sports talks, Red Cross talks and so on. They have been very much manipulated each time by the international situation and domestic economical situation. The first dialogue took place during 1972-73 period, when the North-South Korean Red Cross met to discuss the possibility of reuniting family members separated between the two areas. Subsequently, the two sides agreed to establish a North-South Coordinating Committee to discuss reconciliation and reunification.(56) The result was made public by both sides on July 4, 1972 in a joint communique. The communique declared that the reunification of Korea should be done through independent Korean efforts "without being subject to external imposition or interference", peaceful means and a greater national unity, "transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems".(57)

The sudden overtures in 1972 was triggered by the drastic change of the international situation, so-called "Nixon shock". The U.S. and China had fought with each other to support each ally in Korean War, however, they achieved the rapprochement between them suddenly without any consultations with their own allies. The nationalism of Korean people, stimulated by the sense of alienation, made themselves move toward the overtures. But one year later, this movement came to an end by the North's rejection without any fruitful results. One of the reasons for the North's rejection was believed to be that the North's delegation who visited Seoul felt a threat about South's prosperity for the North to continue the exchanges with the South. Actually, North Korea had kept the economical predominance to South Korea until 1960s, however, it was changed in late 1970s and the gap has never stopped widening since then.

The picture one gets of 1988 to 1990 is that both the North and the South were being pushed toward each other by the trend of world events, which are mainly the collapse of Soviet Union and East European regimes for the North, and the success of Seoul Olympic together with its Economic confidence for the South. Especially for North Korea, it was inevitable to improve the relationship with the West in order to avoid its diplomatic isolation and overcome its economic stagnation. By 1990, nine inter-Korean parliament talks had taken place since 1988. In September 1990, the historic first meeting of the prime ministers of both sides took place in Seoul and in February 1992, the two prime ministers signed and put into effect three auxiliary followed-up protocols to implement the inter-Korean Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South. In addition to these official talks, Chung Chu-Young of Hyundai Group, the millionaire businessman's visit to North with the permission of South Korean

government to talk about joint ventures, made the prospects of the reunification appear more favorable.

Seoul's diplomatic success in Nordpolitik has been quite spectacular. After Seoul Olympic, South Korea established diplomatic relations with nations from East Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China, in spite of the North's denouncing as "making the separation permanent". As Roh Tae-woo said in an interview that his intention of Nordpolitik was "to Pyongyang via Moscow and Beijing", and his final objective was to improve relationship with the North for the sake of soft-landing of reunification through co-existence and exchanges. In the North and South dialogue, it seemed that South Korea tried to accept and compromise with the North's proposals, as much as it could, while North Korea has been really intransigent and has been strongly accusing Nordpolitik as "introducing the external interference into internal matters". Because Pyongyang does know its compromise could be fatal to its regime.

Roh Tae Woo had tried to hold the summit meeting in order to get the drastic improvement between North and South, like Germany. Normalization of the inter-German relation progressed through the summit meetings held in 1970, which was initiated by chancellor Blandt as one of the measures of "Ostpolitik". After the summit meeting, the General Traffic Agreement, the Communication Agreement and Basic Agreement were signed in 1972 and simultaneous attainment of separate U.N. membership was achieved in 1973. In this way, Germany actually began the preparation for reunification almost twenty years prior to it. On the other hand, in the Korean reunification case, the sequence seems to be opposite to the German case which is "summit meeting" first, then "agreement". Although both Koreas achieved the agreement, the summit meeting has never come within the sight yet, in spite of the ardent wish of the South. The "Joint Declaration" and "Agreement" stipulate only the framework of the subjects. The subjects and problems in detail have to be discussed in each subcommittee. However talks have been held by each of the three subcommittees and the Joint Nuclear Control Commission, nothing has resolved yet about long-pending issues such as nuclear inspection or reunion of dispersed family, so far. We should say that the substantial talks between them have just started.

b. Reunification Booming in the South

The recent opinion polls in the South show that the percentage of the people who believe the reunification can be achieved within ten years has been growing. A short time ago, the majority of the people had thought it's "impossible within thirty years" or "impossible within my life time". However, the majority of the people have suddenly begin to support "within ten years" nowadays.(58) This tendency must come from several reasons, such as the extension of its own national power, the self-confidence based on the economical superiority to the North, the success of Nordpolitik, the desire to become a major power, and

the vague sense of reluctance to carry it over to the 21st century, besides the fact of German quick reunification.

Roh Tae Woo's appeasement policy toward the North, based on the democratization of the South, had played an important roll on removing the "taboo" against the North from the people of the South, which had contributed to the reunification booming in South Korea. The "Presidential Declaration" made by Roh Tae Woo on July 7, 1988 eased the restriction for the people to contact North Koreans and also lifted the embargo on the publication and mass communication about the North's information, as part of its democratization. Although Anti-Communist and National Security Laws which restrict North-South exchange have not yet been abolished so far, there is no more taboo about the information from the North. The disappearance of the taboo has stimulated the nationalism of the South Korean people and has created the reunification booming. They don't have the definite image of a unified nation in detail, but have a vague image of an extension of the present life.

Pyongyang seemed to feel threats from the South Korean's "reunification booming". At the first prime minister's talk held on September 5, 1990 in Seoul. the prime minister of North Korea emphasized repeatedly that neither the North nor the South could conquer the other or be conquered by the other, and there was no need for the same nation to resort to fratricide to conquer each other in his keynote address.(59) This address should have shown a part of its concern. In 1990, North Korean approach towards reunification became somewhat defensive, probably brought on in part by the increasingly aggressive stance of the South.

c. Anxiety about Reunification Booming

Amid the reunification booming, some of the South Korean people have been getting anxious about the reality of reunification and have begun to give way to prudence and caution about it. I think there are three reasons for it. The first is the concern about its own economy. The labor disputes escalated by its democratization have already calmed down, however, the trade deficit has become another problem. The import of the South has been increasing by taking measures to boost domestic demand, in spite of the decline in its export. And also, the prospects of its economy are gloomy, because of the world-wide economic depression. In addition to the anxiety of economy, the information about Germany, especially the heavy burden of its reunification cost, has made the South Korean realize the question of the reunification under their own heavy expenses. According to the estimate of Korea Development Institute (KDI), the reunification cost would be 234-245 billion dollars.(60) One Korean newspaper shows the result of its public opinion poll that only 16% uphold the "German style" unification.(61)

The second is its realization of the extravagant difference between North and South. The lift of the embargo on the informa-

tion from the North made the South Koreans look at the North as it is. The people related to the mass media of the South who visited North Korea were overwhelmed by the mysterious atmosphere of the North's society, such as passionate personal cult of Kim Il-sung and his son, enthusiasm for reunification without any knowledge of the South's insistence, and so on. The TV programs of the North which were standardized to the labor mobilization and the personal cult have extremely struck the South's people as incongruous.(62) This kind of live information impressed the fact that the people and society of the North are so much different from them on the South Korean people and consequently, the enthusiasm of the South's people about the reunification was gone.

The third is the generational change. The number of the generation on whom the division has inflicted pain most, such as dispersed family, is getting less year by year. On the other hand, the younger generation who can perceive the reunification in more calm and more calculating manner is getting the leadership in the Korean society. We could say that the reunification issue is just about to be handed over to this new generation.

5. Japanese Perspective of Reunification

a. Japanese Stance Toward Reunification

It is said many Koreans have believed that Japan tried to find solution to her security problem in the division of the Korean Peninsula or Japan tried to clog the reunification for her two-Korea policy. And some Korean professor said that Japan had tried to prolong the Korean division on the pretext of the united Korea's being the potential enemy of Japan.(63) This kind of thinking has been getting pervasive in the South Korean society since Japan-North Korea normalization talk began. All major South Korean daily newspapers carried articles questioning the true motives of the Japanese government policy toward North Korea and expressed concern about the negative role of Japan in the Korean Peninsula, saying that the Japanese massive compensation and economic assistance to North Korea would be a negative impact upon the inter-Korea talks and make it more difficult for the realization of peaceful reunification.(64) According to a poll taken by Seoul NBC in September 1990, the percentage of those who believed that Japan really wanted the reunification of Korea was only 4.4% and the negative answer was 65.5%.(65)

This thinking of the South Korean people comes from their basic idea that the unified Korea could be a major power that would make Japan feel threats. It is true that there are some Japanese people who state that what is most desirable to Japan is a Korea permanently divided. However, I don't think the majority of the Japanese think so. In the Japanese history, we had experienced three occasions which made Japan perceive the Korean Peninsula as her own threat. The first occasion was when the invasion had been attempted by the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty in the 13th century. The second was when Japan had struggled against

China and Russo for the hegemony of the peninsula and Manchuria from the late 19th century to the early 20th century. And the third was when the Korean War had broken out. Even in these three cases, Japan did not perceive the Korean people nor the peninsula itself as her own threat. Japan realized the continental power behind the peninsula as a big menace. The first case was Mongol, the second was Sino and Russo and the third was the communist powers of China and Soviet Union behind Kim Il-sung. The Korean Peninsula was not a threat itself, but merely the corridor for the continental big power for Japan.

The present sense of feeling which the majority of the Japanese people possess is the same as those days. For the Japanese, the Korean Peninsula itself is not the object to show their concern over. From the economical point of view, the whole peninsula after reunification is achieved should be more or less influenced by the Japanese economy. If the unified Korea becomes a stable, liberal and democratic nation based on the market mechanism through the peaceful reunification method, not only Japan but also all other nations in East Asia must have great benefits from the reunification. Japan has no reason to oppose it and she must welcome it.

It is true that there are some well-informed persons who stated that the unified Korea might invade Japan. I believe this statement came from their personal and emotional images about the Korean people. It could be said that the threat of the unified Korea, from the international and historical point of view, is a fiction. However, the Japanese people's stereotyped images about the Korean people, such as "excitable", "hot-tempered", "emotional", "fiery demonstration of the student", "profound animosity against Japanese", and etc., would probably remain the same even after the reunification. Especially the old Japanese people still remembered the reprisals made by the Korean people in several places of Japan just after the Japanese surrender. So, there are some possibilities that the psychological anxiety about the unified Korea in future would spread over the Japanese, if Japan were demanded endlessly the apology, reflection, and compensation for the past by the Korean side. Nevertheless, the psychological anxiety would not be big enough to change the Japanese stance toward the reunification.

As the recent poll, January 1993, revealed that about 60% expressed positive attitude toward reunification and about 10% expressed negative, I think most of the Japanese people are hoping the divided Korea to be unified on an early date by the peaceful measures and to become a stable, peaceful, and democratic nation. The Japanese grave concern is only about the possibilities of thousands of "boat people" and turmoil including nuclear weapon during the process of the reunification. Historically speaking, Japan had rejoiced in peace when the Korean Peninsula was peaceful and stable. It is desirable for Japan to get the stable trading partner just across the straits, not the peculiar nation like that under Kim Il-sung.

b. Japanese Role on the Peninsula

Whatever the style of the reunification might take, the economy of North Korea needs to be revitalized to make up the gap between North and South. The capital investment and technology transfer to the North from outside countries are indispensable for the economic revitalization of the North. Especially, Japan must play an important role for it. Kim Il-sung seems to expect the massive compensation and investment from Japan as the consequence of the rapprochement with Japan, in order to activate the North's economy for establishing co-existence structure. North Korea begins to realize that co-existence is the only way to keep Kim Il-sung regime intact under the present circumstances. And also the co-existence is needed for the German style peaceful reunification. As a result of long-shelved normalization between Japan and North Korea, Japan unintentionally became in the position to affect the North's fate.

Ironically, the present situation of Kim Il-sung is very similar to that of Park Chung Hee in 1961. Park took over the government by coup d'e-tat on May 16, 1961 and started to revitalize the political and economical situation in the South in order to establish the co-existence structure. The situation around him was worst at the time. The U.S. was initially reluctant to accept General Park as the new ruler. And the economical and political assistance from the U.S. had been getting less year by year and much more assistance from the U.S. could not be expected in the future. Faced with the need to attract new sources of investment capital for his economic development plans, Park decided to push ahead with normalization with Japan in the face of fierce domestic opposition. After the diplomatic relations were normalized in 1965, the rapid growth of the South Korean economy started in 1960s, by means of a ten-year \$500 million grant as a sort of compensation and economic assistance which was more than double of its compensation from Japan.

In the ten-year period following diplomatic normalization with Japan, South Korea had achieved the remarkable progress in her economy, by means of capital investment, technology transfer from Japan, and special procurements affected Vietnam War. During the second five-year economic development program since 1967, the South Korea's economy had progressed more than 10% each year. The giant steel mills, shipyards, petrochemical complexes were built through the capital investment and technology transfer from Japan under the powerful leadership of Park Chung Hee. South Korea had succeeded to create the developing cycle of her own economy, in which she exported goods manufactured in those factories to the U.S. and Japan, and then imported new plants from Japan again with its profit. In 1976, South Korea's gross national product was about twenty billion dollars. Approximately one fourth of South Korea's GNP was generated through trade with Japan. South Korea overcame the economic stalemate of 1960s with Japanese assistance and cooperation under the strong leadership of President Park.

Kim Il-sung is located the same position of Park Chung Hee in 1960s. In order to establish the co-existence structure which seems to be the last measure to protect Kim's regime at present, it is indispensable for the North to create the same developing cycle of its own economy. It could be said that North Korea should ironically trace the footsteps of the South in thirty years ago, at present. North Korea needs to do many things, such as to reconstruct the infrastructure, and to modernize the machines, tools, and manufacturing technique, in order to create the economical developing cycle. The North could expect no more economic assistance nor capital investment or technology transfer from China and Russia. The only possible way to get them must be from Japan, just as Park did thirty years ago.

c. Anti-Japanese Sentiments in Korea

As mentioned above, Japan was already deeply involved in the Korean reunification issues unintentionally. However, when Japan deals with the Korean issues, it is very important to consider the anti-Japanese sentiments of the Korean people. Some Tass correspondence of the former Soviet Union wrote that he could not find out at all positive article concerning the Japanese during his eight years' stay in Pyongyang. There was nothing but rebuke, criticism, and warning.(66) Not only the North, but also the South have a strong anti-Japanese sentiments or animosity rooted in the past history. Despite that Japan and the international situation have been greatly changed since the last war, the image of Japan concerned with the foreign policy, defense policy, and domestic policy seems to be remained the same as before the war for the Korean people. Every issue between Japan and Korea has been negotiated under that image. It could be said that the structure of the relationship between the two countries had been formed by the Korean claims reflected from the past and Japanese temporary solutions to get one of a difficult spot.

The word of "pro-Japanese" is said to have a extremely negative connotation, just like a traitor in Korea. Even the "pro-Korean" Japanese who insist the necessity of the Japanese sincerity and a certain period of time to cure their scars of the colonization are sometimes struck with astonishment by the fierce anti-Japanese campaign of the Korean people, which creates the stereotype image of the past. In 1992, when Japan passed the law to allow the Japan Self Defense Force to join the U.N. PKO (Peace Keeping Operation), the Korea's media had been seething with anger and conducted a large scale anti-Japanese campaign by saying "Japanese remilitarization" or "revival of militarism". Some major newspaper of the South put the title of "The revival of Japanese Imperial Army" on its denouncing article, which was already a dead language. Many Japanese, even pro-Korean Japanese, was disgusted at the fact that the word of "Imperial Army" is still alive in Korean mass media.

The government of South Korea seems to have made hay with anti-Japanese sentiments for getting along with Japan. It is

true that the Korea's unique way of approach to Japan, in which the anti-Japanese campaign led by the Korean mass media made the Japanese assistance enlarged by means of stimulating and giving umbrage to the Japanese people, has gotten the fruitful results so far. And also, this kind of sentiments seems to be convenient for its domestic policy which encourages nationalism.

The Korean mass media reports "militarism", "military power", "anxiety and caution" regarding the Japanese issues at every opportunity, but never reports the strong allergy to the military in Japanese society. When the large scale protest movement against the Japanese government broke out, i.e. "text-book crisis" in 1982 caused by the false report of Japanese newspaper about Japanese Education Minister's attempt to reinterpret the Japanese imperialism, the Chun Doo Hwan government had never tried to calm it down nor the Korean news media had revised their reports even after the revised articles were reported by the Japanese newspapers. The Korean news media have never reported the Japanese economic assistance except the \$500 million grant based on the notorious treaty in 1965.

The Japanese economic assistance to the South reached a total of 960 billion yen (\$8 billion), of which 110 billion yen (\$916 million) was in grants and 850 billion yen (\$7.083 billion) was in the form of public loans.(67) However, Japanese ambassador had never been invited to the completion ceremony of even the Japanese assisted project, such as the subway, highway, dam plant and so on. So the public people of South Korea have never known the Japanese contributions. Furthermore, the South's mass media has reported about "comfort woman", intentionally confused with the forcible mobilization of women labor during the war, and has tried to impress the extremely outrageous image of Japanese on the Korean people.(68)

The South Korean mass media have also criticized the pervasion of the Japanese culture in the Korean society. South Korea is presumably the only one nation among the democratic countries which uses the word of "cultural invasion" at present day. There are also few nations in the west which prohibit movie, exhibition or public performance of a specific country. It seems to be something abnormal that South Korea which has already become one of the big trading countries prohibits or tries to exclude the Japanese culture, in spite of more than two million people's mutual visits every year. In the long run, it will prove not a smart policy for the South, because the history will point out the lack of confidence about its own culture to coming generations.

In 1991, one million and four hundred fifty thousands Japanese visited the South and eight hundred sixty thousands Korean came to Japan. Those visits and exchanges will ease and resolve the anti-Japanese sentiments or animosity in future, however, the hard feeling that the anti-Japanese campaign printed on the young generation will be some sort of obstacle to the future relationship between Japan and Korea.